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Abstract 
This article examines the status of economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights in 
Scotland and identifies routes to remedy for violations of these rights. ESC rights 
relate to areas such as housing, education, employment, standard of living and health. 
They also more broadly protect vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, the 
disabled, the unemployed and minority communities. The mapping of rights 
conducted by the Scottish Human Rights Commission before the publication of the 
‘Getting It Right’ report revealed a legal deficit in the protection of ESC rights in 
Scotland. The evidence identified that protection mechanisms for socio-economic 
rights in Scotland are either insufficient or non-existent. This article builds on the 
evidence by exploring the legal nature of ESC rights: how they are currently 
protected in Scotland and how they are protected in other jurisdictions. It then 
examines the concept of a ‘remedy’ in international human rights law and proposes 
models for the better protection of ESC rights for potential future implementation in 
Scotland. This includes an examination of the risks and benefits in constitutionalising 
or legislating for ESC rights in a way that complies with the rule of law.  This, in 
particular, will be of interest for an international audience in a comparative sense in 
terms of the practical and legitimate mechanisms for justiciability and models of 
constitutionalisation for ESC rights in different constitutional contexts, including 
Scotland. 
 
Key words: Economic, social and cultural rights; remedy; justiciability; 
constitutionalisation; enforcement models  
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Introduction 
 
The work undertaken by the Scottish Human Rights Commission during the scoping 
exercise; the publication of the ‘Getting it right’ report; and the subsequent 
development of Scotland’s National Action plan, identified a seismic gap in legal 
protections for economic, social and cultural rights in Scotland. This article builds 
upon this evidence base by setting out routes to remedy for violations of ESC rights 
in both Scotland and beyond. Its aim, therefore, is to contribute to the literature 
identifying practical mechanisms for justiciable ESC rights, both internationally and 
in the Scottish context.  
 
To a certain extent, the adjudication of ESC rights by courts already occurs in 
Scotland and the UK in accordance with the rule of law. The issues discussed in this 
article contribute to an already existing body of practice and explores potential future 
developments. Historically, ESC rights have been viewed with suspicion, as 
explained in the first section of this article. There are many legitimate arguments that 
favour deference to parliament in any decision affecting socio-economic rights. 
However, the long-held outright rejection of ESC rights as legal standards subject to 
judicial scrutiny is now an outdated position.1 Developments in the area have 
transformed the legal landscape and the way in which these rights are viewed – by 
governments, by civil society, by practitioners, and by the judiciary. This does not 
mean that there is no place for deference to parliament but rather, to what extent or in 
what circumstances deference should be preferred over alternative remedies.  This 
article is most timeous in this respect as, increasingly, states are constitutionalising 
and mainstreaming ESC rights. Scotland (and the wider UK) is on the precipice of 
potential change to the existing human rights framework. This article, therefore, aims 
 4 
to contribute to the discussion on any potential changes in relation to ESC rights 
protection so that future developments are made on an informed basis and in a 
legitimate and democratic way. In this respect the article identifies and develops 
routes to remedy for violations of ESC rights in Scotland within the particular 
devolved framework and existing human rights commitments. 
 
The ‘Getting it right’ report provides the critical data in identifying the gaps in ESC 
rights protection that this article seeks to address. The mapping exercise undertaken 
prior to the publication of the report allowed an opportunity to highlight gaps that 
might otherwise have gone unnoticed. For example, relying on case law under the 
ECHR system would not satisfactorily account for all the different types of ESC 
rights violations suffered by people in Scotland because the treaty is not designed to 
capture these rights. Similarly, international monitoring and reporting procedures 
might not always capture the data which relates to the most vulnerable and 
disenfranchised if they have not had an opportunity to engage with the reporting 
process – meaning gaps remain hidden and unidentified. In this sense the mapping of 
rights under the SHRC project facilitated a bottom-up approach to inform the macro 
level rather than the inverse. Lessons can be learned from this methodology when 
states seek to identify and map the substantive nature of rights enjoyment, or lack 
thereof, in a more robust manner. Building up capacity for rights holders, civil 
society and government to be involved in shaping of the national action plan created 
a sense of ownership and awareness over the standards required to comply with 
international law2and is undoubtedly an example of best practice in terms of realising 
a human rights based approach. 
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The report created an evidence base which included the mapping of the existing legal 
framework and identifies a legal deficit in that most treaties that the UK has ratified 
have not been incorporated into domestic law.3 When the UK does not meet these 
international standards there is no legal accountability mechanism to hold the 
government or legislature to account. The report highlighted in particular that,  
‘Although the scoping project notes a few examples of putting rights into 
practice, it suggests inconsistency in a number of areas, even where laws and 
policies are largely rights based. Indeed, in general terms, it is noted that the 
influence of human rights is felt most strongly on our laws and institutions 
and its influence decreases the closer to real life we look. The result is 
unacceptable outcomes for some individuals, particularly the most 
marginalised.’4 
 
The mapping exercise revealed that gaps in human rights protection extended to 
areas including education, health, employment, social security, and standard of living 
with each of these areas indicating a high prevalence of socio-economic rights 
violation. For example, the report highlighted that patterns of illness are inequitably 
spread across the socio-economic spectrum with those living in poverty more likely 
to die early and to suffer from a range of health problems.5  It also referenced 
research indicating a significant gender pay gap in Scotland. In addition it was noted 
that although fair pay is a productive way to assist individuals and families to combat 
poverty, including potential gender based pay discrimination, there is no domestic 
mechanism to ensure fair pay across the board. In fact the legislative mechanism 
regarding a minimum wage has been deemed ‘manifestly unfair’ by the European 
Social Committee in several concluding observations.6 
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Other jurisdictions can learn from the mapping process undertaken in the Scottish 
context in order to build the evidence base needed to demonstrate where existing 
structural mechanisms do not suffice. This article seeks to address the gaps where the 
structure and processes are insufficient for ensuring human rights outcomes lead to 
compliance with ESC rights. The questions that remain unanswered in the literature 
relate to the mechanisms through which justiciability can be legitimately achieved 
for different constitutional frameworks rather than whether the rights are justiciable 
in and of themselves. The intended contribution of this paper is to map out the 
mechanisms for ESC justiciability in Scotland that are required to address the gaps 
uncovered in the mapping exercise. These mechanisms can act as useful points of 
reference for other jurisdictions seeking to fill the same type of lacunae in the legal 
structures and processes to fully account for ESC violations. There is no ‘one size fits 
all’ approach to ESC justiciability and so, critically, an analysis of a myriad  different 
mechanisms provides important lessons for both Scotland and internationally as 
practical solutions are sought to address different types of ESC gaps for different 
types of vulnerable groups. 
 
The Human Rights framework in Scotland 
 
Human rights protection in Scotland operates under two separate legislative regimes 
– one of which is imposed at the devolved level through the Scotland Act 1998 and 
the second of which applies across the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998. There is, 
therefore, a system of human rights protection for devolved matters and a separate 
system for reserved matters. 
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Primarily, the constitutional arrangement under devolution means that the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) takes on a constitutional status under the 
Scotland Act 1998 in relation to devolved matters (section 29). This means that the 
Scottish Parliament must comply with the ECHR in relation to the passage of 
legislation and that Ministers in Government must comply with the ECHR in 
performance of their duties (section 57). To contravene the ECHR is to act 
unlawfully, rendering the action, omission or piece of legislation ultra vires (invalid 
and of no legal effect). This is a ‘rights-affirmative’ framework where the 
presumption is in favour of compliance and the failure to do so renders the act, 
omission or legislative provision unlawful. The ECHR predominantly protects civil 
and political rights as opposed to ESC rights. 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998, on the other hand, enshrines the ECHR at a national 
UK level, through the duty on public bodies to comply with Convention rights 
(Section 6) and the duty on courts to interpret legislation in compliance with ECHR 
in so far as it is possible to do so (Section 3). Section 2 of the Act requires the courts 
to have regard to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR when considering human rights 
compatibility. Should the courts consider Westminster legislation to contravene the 
ECHR without the possibility of interpreting it otherwise then the courts must issue a 
declaration of incompatibility (section 4) – this is different to the effect of the ultra 
vires remedy and the declaration has no legal effect on the application of the 
incompatible legislation. This framework is less robust than the devolved framework 
and ultimately Parliament in Westminster supersedes judicial declarations of 
incompatibility in accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.  
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The future of the Human Rights Act 1998 is currently in the balance with a 
Conservative commitment to repeal the Act and remove the obligation to comply 
with the ECHR to the same degree as currently exists. The previous Conservative 
Government outlined its commitment to replacing the Human Rights Act 1998 with a 
new and revised UK Bill of Rights on its re-election in 2015. Prior to the 2017 
general election and in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Manchester and 
London, the Prime Minister noted that she was prepared to change human rights laws 
should they prevent the government from dealing effectively with the terrorist 
threat.7 Whatever form any eventual proposals may take, it will be difficult to deliver 
change to the existing arrangements in the devolved jurisdictions.8 First, because the 
existing framework in the devolved jurisdictions is so heavily dependent on a ‘rights-
affirmative’ ECHR constitutional framework, meaning repeal of the Human Rights 
Act would not completely remove from ECHR compliance obligations in each of the 
jurisdictions.9 Second, even if the proposals were to go as far as to amend the 
existing devolved legislation to concurrently repeal the Human Rights Act and the 
relevant devolved legislative provisions so as to remove the ECHR from the 
constitutional framework altogether, Westminster would face difficulties in the 
political passage of such changes in Scotland (reaching a potential political impasse 
if the Scottish Parliament refuses to grant a Legislative Consent Memorandum and 
the UK Parliament faced with breaking a constitutional convention to proceed with 
the changes). In Northern Ireland any amendment to the ECHR framework risks 
acting contrary to an internationally binding agreement with the Republic of Ireland 
in connection with human rights.10 Third, since 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon 
incorporated fundamental rights into the EU legal order. The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and ongoing discussions over the EU’s accession to the ECHR 
would mean that the ECHR framework would continue to apply across the UK (in 
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relation to EU matters), unless and until such time as a potential exit from the EU has 
been negotiated. As has been noted in the Miller jurisprudence, some rights and 
remedies enjoyed as part of EU membership – including socio-economic rights – will 
be irrevocably lost on the UK’s departure from the European Union.11 Whilst the 
Government White Paper promises to retain some EU derived rights, such as labour 
rights, it does not explain how this will be achieved and/ or how these rights could be 
protected from erosion under future administrations.12 This becomes all the more 
problematic when contextualised within the devolved administrations as each 
jurisdiction has different devolved powers connected with existing EU competencies. 
It is not yet clear how the transfer of power will be managed in such a way as to 
create a harmonised approach to human rights across the UK, if at all, in a post-
Brexit landscape. 
 
These developments can be compared to the trajectory of human rights protection 
envisaged in the lead up to the Scottish independence referendum.13 The Scottish 
Government’s proposals for the future protection of human rights in Scotland were 
set out in the event of a ‘yes’ vote in the independence referendum.14 The objectives 
of the Government in Scotland had been to seek to further enshrine and extend the 
protection of human rights in the Scottish constitutional framework in the interim 
written constitution (pulling reserved matters within the ECHR rights-affirmative 
framework).15 Granted, this did not come to pass. Nonetheless, there is an important 
opportunity to revisit what constitutional arrangement for human rights should or 
could be adopted in Scotland as a continuing part of the UK. This is part of an 
ongoing conversation on Scotland’s constitutional future. Following the 
recommendations of the Smith Report the Scotland Act 2016 includes further 
devolution in the area of socio-economic inequality with an amendment to the 
 10 
devolved competence of the Scottish Parliament with more powers on socio-
economic rights.16 A new Equality and Human Rights Committee has been 
established and the First Minister has declared a commitment to consideration of 
ESC rights in Scotland’s future constitutional framework.  
 
This article seeks to examine the options for the future protection of economic, social 
and cultural rights in Scotland. This is contextualised in the ongoing discussion on 
the future protection of human rights under the ECHR framework, but, importantly, 
the contribution of this article identifies potential routes to remedy for economic, 
social and cultural rights under existing arrangements and explores legitimate and 
viable constitutional developments for the protection of socio-economic rights as an 
option for future constitutional development. Given that the ECHR is just one of 
many international human rights treaties that the UK has ratified, a full and 
comprehensive consideration of the options means stepping out of the ECHR 
focussed constitutional regime that incorporates mostly civil and political rights in 
Scotland and the UK, and exploring the constitutionalisation or implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights beyond the ECHR framework. This is examined 
in the context of the particular circumstances of Scotland as a devolved entity within 
a wider UK state and takes account of the unique constitutional framework. The 
following sections provide a brief explanation of ESC rights and the concept of 
remedies in international human rights law, and then explores how ESC rights 
operate in practice elsewhere. The article then turns to addressing the options 
available to Scotland in seeking to further secure the protection of ESC rights and, 
finally, explores the potential benefits and risks faced by incorporating economic, 
social and cultural rights into the Scottish constitutional framework. 
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What are economic, social and cultural rights? 
 
Following the Second World War nations throughout the world sought to declare a 
commitment to dignity and human rights. This culminated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 followed by two subsequent Covenants, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 17 These treaties are known collectively as 
the International Bill of Rights. It was intended that each category of rights would be 
implemented concurrently and according to the principle of indivisibility.18 
Subsequent international treaties at both the international and regional level have 
confirmed the legally binding status of these rights and their indivisible nature.19 The 
principle of indivisibility is an important aspect of the purpose and function of 
human rights and means that the fulfilment and enjoyment of one right is dependent 
on the protection and fulfilment of another.20 The full enjoyment of CP rights was 
therefore dependent on the protection and fulfilment of ESC rights – the preparatory 
work to the international treaties reveals that in terms of both categories of rights, it 
was considered an ‘anachronism in the twentieth century to provide for the 
protection of one without the other.’21 
 
However, historically, the legal status of ESC rights has been misunderstood.22 This 
was based on confusion about how ESC rights should be implemented.23 As a result, 
subsequent measures to protect human rights, both at the regional and domestic level 
have erroneously focussed on CP rights and relegated ESC rights to aspirational 
rights that depend solely on the will/ability of the legislature to accommodate. When 
a state has incorporated CP rights into the constitutional framework it means that the 
courts can intervene to provide a remedy when the legislature or executive fail to 
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uphold or comply with these rights. It has long been understood that CP rights are 
‘justiciable’.24 The violation of an ESC right was originally not explicitly open to 
judicial remedies in international law25 but the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the body responsible for overseeing implementation of the ICESCR) 
has called for justiciable remedies26 for violations of ESC rights to be made 
available.27 The Committee also indicates that a blanket refusal to recognise the 
justiciable nature of ESC rights is considered arbitrary and that, ideally, ESC rights 
should be protected in the same way as CP rights within the domestic legal order.28  
 
The UK signed the ICESCR29 on 16 September 1968 and ratified the Covenant on 20 
May 1976. On the matter of justiciability, the Committee has called on the UK to 
ensure that ICESCR ‘is given full legal effect in its domestic law, that the Covenant 
rights are made justiciable, and that effective remedies are available for victims of all 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights.’30 It should be noted that, in the 
same way that CP rights are not all absolute, neither are ESC rights.  The nature of 
ESC rights require states to respect, protect and fulfil these rights in order to 
progressively achieve them to the maximum available resources.31 However, it is 
possible to place limitations on the rights in the same way interference with CP rights 
can be justified in certain circumstances (with the exception of non-derogable rights). 
Incorporation of the rights therefore requires fulfilment to different degrees and there 
is scope to balance fulfilment with a right against other countervailing factors. A 
sensible and balanced approach to ESC implementation  allows for the balancing of 
rights (including competing rights) and takes account of the allocation of limited 
resources. 
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It is now more commonly accepted in the literature and in practice that ESC rights 
can or ought to be judicially enforceable.32 Outstanding questions now relate to how 
best to deliver justiciable remedies, or, through what mechanisms might ESC rights 
be best protected within a particular constitutional framework in a viable and 
legitimate way.  
 
The same can be asked of what place or status ESC rights hold or should hold in 
Scotland. The post- independence referendum and post-EU referendum  landscape 
has provided a critical opportunity to deliberate on these issues, in particular given 
the fragile future of the existing human rights domestic framework. Any change to 
the constitutional framework should happen on a deliberative and informed basis.33 
Critically, this requires an exploration of the viable options open for consideration in 
order to ensure a robust system coupled with safeguards for the particular 
circumstances of Scotland should there be impetus to better secure ESC rights 
protection (or not).  
 
A legitimate and viable constitutionalisation requires consideration of the concerns 
raised in connection with the constitutionalisation of ESC rights and granting the 
judiciary power to adjudicate and provide remedies for violations of ESC rights.34 
Issues relating to democratic legitimacy; polycentricity; expertise; and budgetary 
allocation need to be addressed. They do not, however, exclude the viability of ESC 
rights and ESC adjudication in practice and nor should they be relied on as reasons 
for out an outright rejection of the legitimacy of justiciable ESC rights. .35 Even in 
situations where deference to parliament might be the most appropriate solution the 
judiciary can intervene in more nuanced ways to ensure parliament addresses ESC 
violations (as discussed below). The following sections consider how the concept of 
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remedies has been addressed in international human rights law, how ESC rights are 
protected elsewhere, what mechanisms would be open to Scotland, and finally, how 
to balance the benefits and risks associated with making ESC rights fully justiciable 
in any future developments. 
 
The Concept of a ‘Remedy’ in International Human Rights Law 
 
Before turning to address the protection of ESC rights in other jurisdictions, this 
section provides a brief overview of how the concept of remedies has been 
articulated in international human rights law. The notion of a right to a remedy 
emanates from Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states 
that ‘[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or 
by law.’36 The UDHR, as noted earlier, did not distinguish between civil and political 
rights and economic, social, and cultural rights – this bifurcation was to occur later 
with the enactment of the two covenants – and thus Article 8 can be considered as 
applying to all fundamental rights.  
 
Two separate concepts are inherent in the idea of remedies: ‘[i]n the first sense, 
remedies are the processes by which arguable claims of human rights violations are 
heard and decided, whether by courts, administrative agencies, or other competent 
bodies. The second notion of remedies refers to the outcome of the proceedings, the 
relief afforded the successful claimant.’37 In considering the purpose of remedies we 
can identify those that are applicable to both of these concepts. Shelton, for example, 
emphasises the potential for remedies to provide compensatory or remedial justice; to 
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play a part in condemnation of the violation or retribution; as a form of deterrence; 
and as playing a part in restorative justice or reconciliation.38  
 
The importance of a coherent structure to enable both the existence of and access to 
remedies for violations of human rights law was underscored in 2005 with the 
adoption of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.39 The Basic Principles and 
Guidelines illustrate the wide range of remedies possibly available in international 
human rights law, and include cessation of continuing violations; restitution to the 
extent possible; compensation for physical or mental harm, lost opportunities, moral 
damage, and consequential costs; rehabilitation through medical, psychological, 
legal, or social services; measures of satisfaction, including verification and public 
disclosure of the truth, recovery of the remains of deceased victims, public apologies, 
judicial and administrative sanctions against perpetrators, commemorations and 
tributes to the victims; and guarantees of non-repetition, including institutional 
reforms of military and security forces and the judiciary, trainings, codes of conduct, 
and reviewing and reforming legislation.40  Remedies, of course, can take many 
forms but the importance of a legal remedy for violations of human rights is 
emphasised by Shelton: ‘[m]ost legal systems today recognize the importance of 
safeguarding the rights of access to independent bodies that can afford a fair hearing 
to claimants who assert an arguable claim that their rights have been infringed. 
Indeed, many writers include the element of enforceability in their definition of legal 
rights, because the notion of rights entails a correlative duty on the part of others to 
act or refrain from acting for the benefit of the rights-holder. Unless a duty is 
somehow enforced, it risks being seen as a voluntary obligation that can be fulfilled 
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or ignored at will.’41  This question of enforceability is of particular relevance to the 
debate on ESC rights.  
 
In the Scottish context it is the remedies provided by the ECHR (and Human Rights 
Act) that are arguably most relevant to the current discussion. Article 13 of the 
ECHR was modelled on Article 8 UDHR and outlines the right to an effective 
remedy. It provides: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.’ The ‘Guide to good practice in respect of domestic remedies,’ 
published by the Council of Europe in 2013, emphasises the fundamental importance 
of Article 13 underlying the Convention’s human rights protection system and notes 
that Convention requires that a remedy ‘be such as to allow the competent domestic 
authorities both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and 
to grant appropriate relief.’42  The jurisprudence of the Court has confirmed that a 
remedy will only be considered ‘effective’ (for the purposes of Article 13) if it is 
available and sufficient and it must be sufficiently certain both in theory and in 
practice.43 A remedy must be effective in practice as well as in law44, having regard 
to the individual circumstances of the case.  The Convention system does not 
prescribe any particular form of remedy and, as the good practice guide highlights, 
States parties to the Convention have a margin of discretion in how to comply with 
their obligation.45  However, ‘the nature of the right at stake has implications for the 
type of remedy the State is required to provide’46 and although the Convention deals 
almost exclusively with CP rights, arguments in relation to ESC rights have arisen in 
connection with several Convention rights, as discussed below.  Article 13 is also 
central to the co-operative relationship between national legal systems and that of the 
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Convention, one of the main aims of which is to encourage remedies before domestic 
legal authorities so that it is not necessary to resort to the Strasbourg machinery.47  
This is all the more relevant in the current context of hostility to the Strasbourg court 
amongst some quarters of the UK political and judicial establishment. 
 
Justiciability of ESC Rights and Remedies for their violation 
 
The general arguments in repudiation of the justiciability of ESC rights are numerous 
but generally centre on four main themes: a democratic deficit;  the judiciary 
interfering in the policy matters of the state impinges on the separation of powers; 
the judiciary lacks the expertise to decide such matters and it is beyond the 
institutional capacity of the Courts; and lastly, accountability can be secured through 
other institutional alternatives, such as administrative bodies (specialised tribunals, 
ombudsmen, and alternative dispute resolution). Each of these arguments raise 
serious issues in relation to the legitimacy and competency of the judiciary deciding 
cases brought in terms of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. 
  
In response to these arguments Nolan et al have argued that the rejection of 
justiciable ESC rights is no longer viable on the basis that the judiciary already has a 
role in holding elected representatives accountable: 
 
‘[T]he judiciary has an important role to play in enhancing democratic 
governance by reviewing governments’ decisions for compliance with 
fundamental rights[...]The democratic legitimacy of such review is derived 
from the need to ensure that the rights of minorities or of politically 
powerless groups are not violated by majoritarian decision-making. Decisions 
about social and economic programmes or policies may have fiscal 
consequences in areas that were historically defended as the preserve of 
elected branches of government, but they are also those in which the most 
disadvantaged and politically marginalised groups will often have the most at 
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stake in terms of personal security and dignity. Seen in this light, judicial 
review of government actions by courts to ensure that human rights are not 
violated would seem to be as legitimate in the socio-economic realm as in 
other areas of governmental action.’48 
 
In fact, viewed within the misconception surrounding the dichotomy of rights it is 
arguable that the repudiation of ESC justiciability is based on a false premise from 
the outset. For example, it has been posited that misconceptions around the status of 
ESC rights and separation into binary categories has ‘sprang from a legal fiction’49 
This would certainly reflect the misconception emanating from the point of 
bifurcation as discussed above. The gap identified  here reflects the observations of 
leading academics and practitioners that it is the outstanding questions relating to 
legitimate legal mechanisms (forms of applicability and delivery), as opposed to the 
legality of justiciability per se, that remain unaddressed.  
 
Tinta proposes that, rather than subjugate ESC rights to a lower status because of 
weak applicability or delivery measures, practitioners must explore the 
underdeveloped justiciability of ESC rights.50 On discussing remedies in 
international law Higgins has clarified that ‘problems about delivery leave [one’s] 
rights a right none the less’51 and Tinta, building on Higgins’ proposal, identifies that 
delivery of substantive ESC protection must be sought through a ‘myriad of forms’.52 
In this sense, the absence of substantive justiciable mechanisms does not negate the 
existence of the right. This means that in terms of ESC rights the outstanding 
question comes down to how to provide an effective remedy in law within legitimate 
justiciable parameters. 
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The concept of remedies for rights violations is very much interlinked with that of 
justiciability. As noted earlier, the idea that ESC rights are not justiciable has now 
been debunked, both in theory and in practice and only appears today ‘as a quiet 
echo from the past.’53 As the following section illustrates, domestic justiciability has 
been embraced in numerous jurisdictions that have taken on the challenge of 
enforcing ESC rights, which as Roach highlights, does involve a re-think of our 
traditional concepts of remedies: ‘[t]he challenge of enforcing ESC rights may 
require some re-thinking of the traditional idea that remedies must be immediate and 
track the contours of the right and the violation, and that the courts can order one 
shot remedies that achieve corrective justice.’54 The response of the Scottish 
government to the issues highlighted by the CESCR correctly outlines that important 
aspects of the Covenant already find expression in the law of Scotland55; the 
examples discussed in the following section indicate that the crucial next step must 
be the implementation of legally enforceable remedies for violations of these rights. 
 
 
How are ESC rights protected elsewhere? 
 
Recently we have seen examples of the judiciary in different countries establishing 
ESC rights as part of existing constitutional and legislative structures through an 
evolving approach to international human rights law. For example, in Germany the 
judiciary held that the Basic Law, together with Article 9 ICESCR (the right to social 
security), included a stand-alone right to a minimum level of subsistence below 
which no person should fall.56 In Latvia, the courts intervened when the state sought 
to reduce the state pension by up to 70% in order to meet requirements of loans with 
the IMF and the EU.57 The courts held that the reduction in state pension was 
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unconstitutional and contrary to Article 9 ICESCR and that the provisions of the loan 
should not supersede fundamental human rights.58 The European Court of Human 
Rights has held that there are socio-economic dimensions to civil and political 
rights59 and has extended CP rights in the ECHR to encompass related ESC rights.60 
For example, the court has extended Article 8 to encompass the right to adequate 
housing respecting cultural dimensions in the case of nomadic travellers61 and, more 
broadly, protection from unlawful eviction.62 In the case of Yordanova63 the ECtHR 
specifically referred to various international standards64, including the standard set by 
ICESCR in connection with the right to adequate housing and the corollary positive 
duties incumbent on the state to respect this right.65  
 
In the UK the judiciary has relied on ESC rights in holding that the rights of the child 
should be of paramount importance when considering immigration matters.66 
Likewise, in a case based on Article 3 ECHR, the House of Lords held that there 
must be a minimum level of subsistence available to support asylum seekers in the 
UK who fall below a threshold of destitution, such as to amount to inhuman and 
degrading treatment.67 Socio-economic rights are also subject to adjudication and 
potential protection under the aegis of equality legislation. There are both domestic 
and international examples of litigation based on non-discrimination that has 
inadvertently secured the protection of socio-economic rights.68 Under the Equality 
Act 2010 the court can declare a budgetary decision unlawful if, for example, a 
public body has failed to have due regard to the potential adverse impact on a group 
that share a protected characteristic.69 Public bodies are required to conduct equality 
impact assessments to ensure the least disproportionate measure is used to secure any 
changes to the allocation of resources. This directly engages with socio-economic 
rights and provides a form of procedural protection in their implementation (i.e. that 
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there is an obligation to have due regard to equality of opportunity as opposed to an 
obligation to ensure equality of opportunity).  
 
These cases are examples of the judiciary implementing ESC rights through the 
rubric of CP rights, through equality legislation, or through direct incorporation of 
international standards as part of the common law. However, these developments do 
not reflect a move towards full incorporation or protection of ESC rights, they are 
simply examples of where the protection of ESC rights has been partially extended 
by the judiciary. This approach, while tentatively applied in the UK in some cases, 
risks breaching the principle of parliamentary supremacy. This is evident, for 
example, in the recent Supreme Court case determining the legality of the cap on 
housing benefits where the court, divided on whether international human rights 
should place limitations on the legislature without having been incorporated into UK 
law, narrowly rejected the applicants’ case even though the legislative provisions 
were incompatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.70 
 
Some states have sought to introduce more clear and transparent multi-institutional 
approaches to ESC rights by clearly setting out the expectations of the legislature, 
government and judiciary in explicit terms when dealing with ESC rights.71 Again, 
this does not necessarily mean full incorporation, for example, but can mean 
protecting ESC rights to varying degrees (often along the respect, protect, fulfil axis). 
One example would be to use a ‘rights-affirmative’ framework, with an option for 
parliamentary derogation (retaining parliamentary sovereignty),72 another would be 
to introduce forms of procedural protection such as a duty to have due regard to the 
ICESCR.73 The South African model is often referred to as the archetypal example of 
ESC constitutionalisation. This model employs a mixture of substantive rights 
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recognition, together with safeguards and limitation clauses contained in the 
Constitution. Rights are afforded protection to different degrees along the respect, 
protect, promote, fulfil axis. Some ‘negative’ rights enjoy immediate protection such 
as the right not to be evicted without fair procedure.74 Some rights are afforded non-
derogable status75, such as rights relating to children.76 Other rights are considered to 
be subject to progressive realisation such as the right to access adequate housing and 
the right to access health care, food, water and social security.77 There is a general 
limitation clause under section 36 whereby rights may be limited if reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society.78 
 
In Finland, a hybrid constitutional model is in place with safeguards ensured through 
ex ante parliamentary scrutiny79 of potential legislation and ex post judicial review of 
enacted legislation80 as a means of last resort.81 The Finnish Constitution obligates 
the parliament to legislate for ESC rights so there is a presumption in favour of 
Parliament deciding how best to provide for ESC rights. The Constitutional Law 
Committee of Parliament in Finland conducts a thorough review of legislation prior 
to enactment to ensure legal compliance with human rights.82 The decision of the 
Committee on the compatibility of legislation with constitutional rights, including 
ESC rights, is binding on Parliament.83 In Sweden a similar pre-enactment review 
process is in place. Thomas Bull has argued that this type of ex ante review of 
legislation through the Parliamentary system makes it difficult (although not 
impossible) to legislate in a way that infringes fundamental rights.84 The court, 
however, is required as a means of last resort to ensure executive and legislative 
compliance. 
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This approach is not too far removed from the role played by the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (JCHR) in the Westminster Parliament.85 However, ESC rights are not 
granted constitutional status in the uncodified UK Constitution. The 
recommendations of the JCHR are not binding on the UK Parliament and any ex ante 
review of legislation does not impact on the passing of legislation, other than as a 
means of informing the process.86 For example, in the passing of the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012 the JCHR raised significant concerns about the impact on vulnerable 
groups, disproportionate discrimination and the infringement of ESC rights.87 The 
consequent adjudication in the Supreme Court revealed similar concerns.88 Neither 
the JCHR nor the court were able to oblige Parliament to revisit a more proportionate 
means of achieving welfare reform in accordance with international ESC standards. 
In Scotland, an Equality and Human Rights Committee has recently been established 
– however there is currently no specific focus for the Committee to consider 
compliance with ESC rights as part of its remit. This means that currently there is no 
mechanism for ex ante or ex post review of ESC rights compatibility of Acts of the 
Scottish Parliament. In other words, ESC compatibility is not regularly assessed as 
part of the legislation process in Scotland.  
 
How could ESC rights be better protected in Scotland? 
 
Currently there are a number of options available for the immediate protection of 
ESC rights in Scotland. These include using the continuing development of 
adjudication extending CP rights to ESC rights as discussed above. For example, 
practitioners can explore options to extend the protection of ESC rights under the 
relevant ECHR provisions such as Article 8 (right to private and family life), Article 
2 (the right to life), or Article 3 (freedom from inhumane and degrading treatment) 
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and so on.89 This approach depends very much on the dynamic or evolutive 
interpretation of CP rights – and whilst a useful tool to practitioners seeking to better 
protect ESC rights, it is limited due to the nature of the approach being founded in a 
treaty focussing on CP rights (the ECHR).90 This means rights relating to education, 
standard of living, employment and health, will not be granted the same degree of 
protection as envisaged in treaties such as ICESCR or the European Social Charter. 
 
Another option for the immediate implementation of ESC rights is to rely on already 
existing legislative provisions relating to ESC issues – where either the Scottish 
Parliament or Westminster have created a legislative system to better protect ESC 
rights without necessarily relying on international standards.91 An example of this 
would be the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, which sets a minimum hourly 
income for workers in the UK. The purpose of this Act is to ensure that persons who 
are working are able to earn sufficient remuneration for work in order to support an 
adequate standard of living. However, on an independent examination of the national 
minimum wage the European Social Committee has determined it unfit for purpose 
and ‘manifestly unfair’ in achieving the aim of raising workers out of poverty.92 The 
European Social Committee is responsible for oversight of the European Social 
Charter (the Council of Europe regional treaty dealing with ESC rights). There is no 
Council of Europe court that deals with violations of ESC rights in the same way as 
the ECtHR and in any event the UK is not party to the existing collective complaints 
mechanism.93 Without scrutiny of compliance with international standards by a 
parliamentary committee or a court there is a risk that domestic legislation will fall 
short of implementing rights according to international standards. 
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Another route to a remedy for a violation of ESC rights is to use the EU legal 
framework that gives direct effect to fundamental rights when implementing EU 
law.94 The UK sought to limit the justiciability of ESC rights contained in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union has 
held that Protocol 3095 does not exempt the UK from existing obligations under the 
Charter.96 There is scope to further explore where the Charter can protect socio-
economic rights in Scotland when connected to the implementation of EU law, 
although this is of course now subject to any changes to the UK’s relationship with 
the EU as a result of the referendum decision of 23 June 2016 to leave the EU.97 
 
It is within the power of the Scottish Parliament to observe and implement 
international obligations98 and so options for future implementation of ESC rights 
can be explored within the current devolved constitutional framework. There is 
already precedent for Scotland ‘going further’ than the Westminster Parliament in 
subscribing to international commitments, one such example being the enactment of 
the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001, which brought provisions of 
the Rome Statute 1998 into Scottish law.  
 
 
Future options 
 
In December 2014 James Wolffe, previously Dean of the Faculty of Advocates and 
now Lord Advocate, considered a number of potential constitutional arrangements 
should Scotland choose to implement ESC rights in the future.99 First, Wolffe 
suggests the option of using the existing Scotland Act 1998 framework and 
extending constitutional status to ESC rights in Scotland in the same way that the 
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ECHR is currently protected through a section 29 type of clause.100 This could be 
achieved through an amendment to the Scotland Act itself, which would require the 
passage of legislation at Westminster.101 Or, it could be a ‘self-regulatory’ Act 
introduced in the Scottish Parliament where the Scottish Parliament limits its own 
power.102 A second option would be to use the Human Rights Act 1998 structure, 
which encompasses different implementation mechanisms, including an 
interpretative clause; a duty imposed on public bodies to comply; and an option for 
the courts to make declarations of incompatibility.103 Again, it is beyond the 
competence of the Scottish Parliament to amend the Human Rights Act itself,104 but 
the devolved legislature could pass secondary legislation of a similar structure 
relating to the ICESCR as opposed to the ECHR.105 The third option proposed by 
Wolffe is to implement ESC rights by imposing a duty to have due regard to the 
rights contained in an international treaty such as the ICESCR, similar to the 
approach of the Welsh Assembly when implementing a procedural duty to consider 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 2011, and once again, it 
would be within the power of the Scottish Parliament in connection with the 
observance or implementation of international obligations.106 
  
Any one of these options could grant ESC rights a form of constitutional status 
through a Scottish Bill of Rights or Charter of Rights introduced by an Act of the 
Scottish Parliament.107 In fact, it would be open to the Scottish Parliament to legislate 
to meet international ESC standards in devolved areas within the Parliament’s 
competence through specific legislation designed to address ESC rights. In the same 
way that devolved legislation is subject to repeal (by the Parliament itself) or 
challenge (by private legal persons or the Advocate General) each of these legislative 
options would also be open to change, such is the nature of an uncodified 
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constitution. It is important to note, therefore, that any such mechanism does not 
entrench ESC rights per se, but would constitutionalise the rights in so far as it is 
possible to do so in a system that respects parliamentary supremacy. That is to say 
that it is open to both the Scottish Parliament and the UK Parliament to introduce 
‘self-regulatory’ legislation that imposes limits on the legislature to comply with 
international human rights standards, as is already the case.108  
 
Another option for Scotland would be for the Scottish Parliament to use its new 
powers under the Scotland Act 2026. Section 38 of the Scotland Act 2016 devolves 
competence to the Scottish Parliament to introduce a socio-economic equality duty in 
Scotland by commencing section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 in Scotland. The 
explanatory notes to the Equality Act 2010 provide that the socio-economic equality 
provision (which was never commenced in any part of the UK by the then newly-
elected UK Coalition Government in 2010109) places an obligation on public bodies 
to consider the impact of decisions on disadvantaged socio-economic groups. The 
purpose of the provision was to reduce inequalities in education, health, housing, 
crime rates or other matters associated with socio-economic disadvantage.110  
Following amendment to the reservation the Scottish Parliament could become the 
first part of the UK to address socio-economic disadvantage directly and explicitly 
through equality legislation.111 This would make it possible to introduce a procedural 
safeguard for ESC rights by addressing socio-economic disadvantage.  In the same 
way that the Equality Act 2010 operates, it would only be within the power of the 
Scottish Parliament to introduce a procedural duty to have ‘due regard’ to addressing 
socio-economic disadvantage as opposed to imposing a duty to achieve equality of 
outcome.112 In terms of ESC protection, this is a weaker form of remedy, than say, 
for example, for incorporation of ICESCR and substantive protection of ESC rights. 
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Of course, an examination of these types of mechanisms can help set out potential 
options for other jurisdictions. As noted above, in discussing the implementation of 
ESC rights both Tinta and Higgins have separately highlighted the need to explore a 
‘myriad’ of forms.113 There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach in the pursuit of ESC 
protection or justiciability and so the exploration of better protection mechanisms is 
about knowledge sharing and capacity building between different jurisdictions. In the 
same way that Scotland can learn lessons from other jurisdictions so too can lessons 
be learned from Scotland’s experience – in particular in relation to the mapping of 
gaps and the identification of the structures required for a particular constitutional 
framework. This process in and of itself offers crucial lessons comparatively 
speaking. 
 
 
Benefits and Risks 
 
As with any proposed constitutional or legislative change that alters the way human 
rights are protected, it is important to consider the potential risks as well as the 
potential benefits. Before the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 there was 
widespread concern that granting the judiciary power relating to the adjudication of 
human rights would interfere with the separation of power. It was argued that this 
would lack democratic legitimacy and that deference to parliament was the most 
appropriate principle in the determination of human rights issues.114 These same 
concerns are raised in connection with affording the judiciary the power to determine 
ESC rights in areas of complex policy, which directly engages the allocation of state 
resources. Of course, there is still room for deference in the determination of rights, 
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however, this could be one of many routes open to the judiciary in a variety of 
innovative remedies for ESC rights. It is a legitimate concern that judicial supremacy 
could usurp the role of the legislature in determining matters relating to the allocation 
of limited resources across different socio-economic areas.115 And so, it would be 
inappropriate to afford unelected judges a monopoly on decisions regarding 
polycentric issues with far reaching budgetary implications. However, that does not 
preclude the judiciary from having any role whatsoever in the process. As Wolffe 
notes, the question of whether the court should be given a role in assessing 
compliance with ESC rights is ‘a political or constitutional question, not a conceptual 
one.’ 116 
 
We propose that courts can employ a variety of different types of judicial review in 
the determination of ESC rights: reasonableness, legality, proportionality, procedural 
fairness, and even anxious scrutiny. Courts are also well equipped to develop 
innovative remedies in order to identify the most appropriate way of determining a 
case.117  One such option is a structural interdict, where following a review of 
legislation a court can issue a structural order for parliament, the government or a 
public body to revisit a legislative provision, decision or policy within a particular 
timeframe and with particular instructions to help ensure compatibility – this could 
be, for example, an instruction to ensure that a particular type of procedure is 
followed such as a budgetary analysis that takes ESC rights into consideration. This 
places the remedy back in the hands of the other branches of state and grants the 
court a supervisory role.118 Likewise, there is scope for declaratory orders (like a 
declaration of incompatibility) or ultra vires remedies – where an action or piece of 
legislation can be declared unlawful.119 The particular structure or framework is open 
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to deliberation – as is the degree of protection to be afforded to ESC rights – whether 
that be procedural, substantive or a mixture of both.  
 
Rather than view the adjudication of ESC rights as a threat to the separation of 
powers the constitution could reflect a multi-institutional system where compatibility 
with ESC rights is shared between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary – 
where one holds another to account and the judiciary acts as a means of last resort. 
There are a variety of institutional safeguards employed throughout the world in 
order to ensure balance in the separation of powers when determining human rights, 
including ESC rights. For example, the constitution of Argentina permits the 
executive to derogate from fundamental rights if a two-thirds majority in both houses 
of parliament consent to so doing. In Canada the courts have the power to strike 
down unconstitutional legislation, including legislation that contravenes human 
rights.120 However, parliament has the power to override compliance with the 
constitutional Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms121 (the ‘notwithstanding’ 
clause). This effectively places the final say on human rights compliance back in the 
hands of the legislature; at the same time, the use of the clause may risk strong 
political opposition. At the very least, it places compliance as the default position and 
derogation from rights as a secondary position that can only occur in a transparent 
and explicit declaration. The Canadian courts have also employed mechanisms such 
as delayed remedies to allow the legislature time to comply with judgments when 
violations of rights have been identified.122 Each of these examples are by no means 
ideal – but certainly they are indicative of attempts to balance responsibility for 
human rights compliance between the different arms of the state.  
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Another key example cited above was the use of pre-legislative scrutiny. Ex-ante 
review of legislation is an excellent way of ensuring that ESC rights are considered 
during the drafting process. In Finland the constitution protects ESC rights but leaves 
it to Parliament to legislate for the substantive fulfilment of the rights. The 
compatibility of the legislation is reviewed by an independent parliamentary 
committee during the passage of a Bill and the courts only intervene to review 
compliance as a means of last resort. This would be an option open to Scotland and 
certainly it would be within the power of the Scottish Parliament Equality and 
Human Rights Committee to include within its remit consideration ofESC 
compatibility before legislation is enacted.  It is within the competent function of 
committees to consider international treaties such as a Human Rights Committee 
responsible for considering whether legislation complies with international human 
rights law.123 
 
In any event – judicial remedies should be a means of last resort. There are a variety 
of ways to mainstream ESC rights within the decision-making process without the 
need to rely on courts as a first port of call.124 Furthermore, there are ways in which 
safeguards can ensure that, whilst it is important that individuals have access to 
justice, there are a number of ways to avoid a ‘floodgate’ scenario. One such 
mechanism is to ensure that judicial review is an option only after all other routes to 
remedy have been exhausted – such as through engagement with grievance 
procedures, internal complaint mechanisms, with the relevant public ombudsman, 
and so on. In the same way that CP rights are mainstreamed in Scotland it is unlikely 
a flood of ESC cases would arise if ESC rights are also mainstreamed in the 
decision-making process. There are a variety of other mechanisms used by the 
judicial system to ensure that similar cases do not flood the system, one such 
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mechanism is to allow for the conclusion for a test case and sist (temporarily delay) 
all other cases that are directly affected by the outcome.125 This allows for a 
jurisdictional judicial approach to control a number of similar cases and is well 
within the capability of the judicial structure to administer. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As identified above, the benefits of implementing ESC rights are self-evident in 
many respects - it means that individuals will have better access to rights directly 
relating to their conditions of living. This includes the better protection of 
employment rights126, rights relating to pensions127, rights which protect an adequate 
standard of living128, rights relating to healthcare129 and rights relating to 
education,130 amongst others. It would ensure that vulnerable and marginalised 
groups, including children, the elderly, the disabled and the unemployed receive 
protection in the progressive realisation of their rights and the alleviation of poverty 
in a majoritarian political system that can marginalise minorities.131 It would also 
mean that there is an opportunity to mainstream ESC rights when considering issues 
that are not currently protected by the ECHR – such as balancing the right to 
property132 with the wider public interest in fulfilling ESC rights as part of the 
ongoing Land Reform proposals in Scotland.133 Likewise, it would mean that the 
human rights framework in Scotland would be amongst one of the leading 
constitutional settlements globally in the protection of ESC rights in accordance with 
international law. Should there be impetus to further develop ESC rights protection it 
can be achieved in a way that suits the particular constitutional circumstances of 
Scotland with appropriate safeguards and in accordance with the rule of law. This 
would place Scotland on the world stage as a leader in the field of human rights, 
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equality, inclusion and fairness. Ultimately, although ESC rights are internationally 
recognised legal standards (as opposed to political aspirations) any change to the 
existing domestic legal arrangements requires political impetus and the support of the 
electorate. This article seeks to inform the debate in order to support informed and 
inclusive deliberation of the options on the future implementation of ESC rights. 
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